UC知道大家帮忙看看？先谢谢了
来源：百度知道 编辑：UC知道 时间：2024/05/30 04:31:47
谢谢了
麻烦了 大家帮忙看看
不要求翻译的多么漂亮
就是希望不用软件直接来
谢谢了
1.2.The Discretionary Power of the Public Bodies
It is widely recognized that, in public procurement, when some of the important
dimensions of the trade relationship are non-contractible, this generates major risks for opportunistic behaviour and may lead to an inefficient outcome for a buyer. Manelli and Vincent(1995)or Bajari and Tadelis(2001)for instance, show that in the presence of non-contractible qualitative aspects, auctioning leads selecting firms to produce goods at the lowest cost but with the lowest level of non-contractible quality. In such a context, allowing a public buyer to exercise his discretion to exclude dubious providers ex ante and/or punish opportunistic suppliers ex post is seen as desirable and efficient, especially in repeated procurement(Kim 1998,Doni 2006,Calzolari, Spagnolo 2006). In a context of frequent contracting, limiting participation by introducing a pre-qualificatio
麻烦了 大家帮忙看看
不要求翻译的多么漂亮
就是希望不用软件直接来
谢谢了
1.2.The Discretionary Power of the Public Bodies
It is widely recognized that, in public procurement, when some of the important
dimensions of the trade relationship are non-contractible, this generates major risks for opportunistic behaviour and may lead to an inefficient outcome for a buyer. Manelli and Vincent(1995)or Bajari and Tadelis(2001)for instance, show that in the presence of non-contractible qualitative aspects, auctioning leads selecting firms to produce goods at the lowest cost but with the lowest level of non-contractible quality. In such a context, allowing a public buyer to exercise his discretion to exclude dubious providers ex ante and/or punish opportunistic suppliers ex post is seen as desirable and efficient, especially in repeated procurement(Kim 1998,Doni 2006,Calzolari, Spagnolo 2006). In a context of frequent contracting, limiting participation by introducing a pre-qualificatio
1.2.the自由裁量权的公共机构
人们普遍认识到，在公共采购中，当一些重要的
层面的贸易关系是不收缩，这会产生大的风险，为投机取巧的行为，并可能导致效率低下的结果为买方。 manelli和郑海泉（ 1995 ）或鲍亚里和tadelis （ 2001 ），例如表明，在存在非收缩的质量方面，拍卖导致公司选择生产货物以最低的成本，但与最低水平的非收缩质量。在这种背景下，让公众买方行使其酌情权，以排除可疑的供应商事先和/或惩罚机会主义的供应商事后被看作是可取的和有效率，尤其是在重复采购（金1998年，多尼在2006年，卡尔佐拉里， spagnolo 2006 ）。在一个背景下频繁承包，限制参与引入资格预审阶段，例如和/或提供可信的威胁排除在合同执行确实会鼓励企业尊重他们的声誉的承诺，高非收缩质量。作为所提出的compte ，等人。 （ 2005年，临9 ） ， “一个共同的理由[酌情权甄选过程]是
可能有质量的关注，该合同的方式将处理，并官僚可能更好地评估相对质量的每家公司的报价“ 。
好的。
看过了。 不用谢。 呵呵。