UC知道急求翻译，英译汉。
来源：百度知道 编辑：UC知道 时间：2024/06/03 14:04:46
麻烦把下面这些给翻一下，谢了。
This note analyzes the choice of managerial incentives in an oligopoly consisting of both managerial and entrepreneurial firms. Our objective is to examine how the number of managerial firms affects the equilibrium choice of managerial incentive scheme. By an entrepreneurial firm, we mean a firm owned and managed by the same person. Consequently an entrepreneurial firm’ s owner makes the output decision himself and does not engage in strategic delegation. However, the owner of a managerial firm delegates the output decision to a manager and provides the manager with proper incentives. As in the related literature, our analysis completely eschews he potential agency problems, even though they are certainly important. To simply the analysis, we also assume that the managerialincentive contracts are common knowledge and non-renegotiable (see Fershtman and Kalai (1997)for analysis of unobserved delegation).
Since the results from the
This note analyzes the choice of managerial incentives in an oligopoly consisting of both managerial and entrepreneurial firms. Our objective is to examine how the number of managerial firms affects the equilibrium choice of managerial incentive scheme. By an entrepreneurial firm, we mean a firm owned and managed by the same person. Consequently an entrepreneurial firm’ s owner makes the output decision himself and does not engage in strategic delegation. However, the owner of a managerial firm delegates the output decision to a manager and provides the manager with proper incentives. As in the related literature, our analysis completely eschews he potential agency problems, even though they are certainly important. To simply the analysis, we also assume that the managerialincentive contracts are common knowledge and non-renegotiable (see Fershtman and Kalai (1997)for analysis of unobserved delegation).
Since the results from the
本说明分析了选择管理奖励在寡头组成的管理和创业公司。我们的目标是研究如何管理的若干影响企业的均衡选择，管理的奖励办法。由创业公司，我们的意思了坚实的拥有和管理的由同一人。因此创业公司的老板让他本人和产量的决定不搞战略代表团。然而，拥有管理公司代表输出决定的经理和管理人员提供适当的奖励。在相关文献，我们的分析完全避开了他潜在的机构问题，尽管它们固然重要。简单的分析，我们还以为managerialincentive合同是共同的知识和非重新谈判（见Fershtman和Kalai （ 1997 ）分析观测代表团） 。
由于从文献结果表明，当企业间的竞争批量的战略使用管理代表团允许公司发挥更积极，在我们的模型增加了一些管理公司可能会被称为提高竞争力。我们的分析表明，提高竞争能力，将增加利润奖励相对提供给管理人员。人们还知道，一个管理公司的利润总和超过了所有的创业企业的利润。然而，管理公司在某些情况下可能赚不到经常诺均衡。 。
设置认为似乎是关闭的情况在许多新兴市场的亚洲，非洲，东欧和拉丁美洲。在这些市场，许多中小型企业的企业间的竞争与大型企业和决策的那些大型企业往往涉及管理代表团。
我们的模型也可阐明管理代表团高新技术产业组成的大量小型创业公司。