UC知道急求翻译，英译汉、
来源：百度知道 编辑：UC知道 时间：2024/06/19 03:18:56
因为没多少分了，所以大仙们可以免费帮我下吧。谢了，
As noted in the literature, given the opportunity of strategic delegation, each managerial firm would give its manager an incentive to be more aggressive than in the regular Cournot equilibrium. The intuition of Proposition 1 is that, as the number of managerial firms increases, firms would like to hold back the aggressiveness to avoid lowering the market price too much. This observation is in general accordance with the result obtained in Fershtman and Judd (1987), who considered an industry consisting of managerial firms only. What is new from our analysis is that the result also prevails in an industry consisting not only of managerial firms but also of entrepreneurial firms.
Combining Equation (6) with Equations (3) and (4) yields the equilibrium output. Let the subscript m denote the managerial firm and the subscript e t
As noted in the literature, given the opportunity of strategic delegation, each managerial firm would give its manager an incentive to be more aggressive than in the regular Cournot equilibrium. The intuition of Proposition 1 is that, as the number of managerial firms increases, firms would like to hold back the aggressiveness to avoid lowering the market price too much. This observation is in general accordance with the result obtained in Fershtman and Judd (1987), who considered an industry consisting of managerial firms only. What is new from our analysis is that the result also prevails in an industry consisting not only of managerial firms but also of entrepreneurial firms.
Combining Equation (6) with Equations (3) and (4) yields the equilibrium output. Let the subscript m denote the managerial firm and the subscript e t
正如文学，有机会的战略代表团，各管理公司将其管理人员的奖励将更加积极比经常诺均衡。在直觉命题1的是，随着一些管理公司的增加，企业要阻挡攻击，以避免降低市场价格太多。这种看法是一般根据得到的结果在Fershtman和朱迪（ 1987年） ，谁认为是行业管理公司组成的唯一。什么是新的从我们的分析是，由于还普遍存在的一个行业，不仅包括企业的管理，而且还创业公司。
结合方程（ 6 ）与方程（ 3 ）和（ 4 ）收益率的平衡输出。让下标m指管理公司和下标e的创业公司。从此
与相应的均衡价格由
它可以检查的
如果所有的公司，但公司1顷创业公司（即κ = 1 ） ，可以看到由方程（ 6 ） ，一个= 1 - （ ñ - 1 ） （一-三） / （ 2nc ） ，因此， P2的为I = （一-三） / 19-4 。这一结果直观明确的，因为在这种情况下，我们的模式产量克尔伯格结果1正以坚定的克尔伯格领导者。请注意，显然是一个管理公司赚取更大的利润超过其竞争对手的企业。这只是从一个事实，即管理代表团使管理公司承诺更具侵略性的输出，从而转移利润的创业公司的管理公司。另一种方法的推理是， = 1是一个可以选择为每个管理公司。也许是有趣的是，质量管理= nqe和下午=展会不论有多少企业管理中存在的行业。这个相当不错的成绩似乎是驱动力的规格线性需求和线性的成本结构。