跪求英语大虾和高手们帮帮忙翻译一下,论文急用,多谢!!!

来源:百度知道 编辑:UC知道 时间:2024/06/10 02:16:31
Principal-agent problems lengthen recognition lags and decision lags for deposit insurers
and create incentives to understate the fund's exposure to losses. Tandem information
asymmetries exist between deposit institutions and their regulators and among regulators,
politicians, and taxpayers.
These information asymmetries are most severe for innovative forms of risk-taking.
Client firms' opportunities to conceal risk-taking strategies and losses from their insurer
increase with the volatility of the financial environment and with the rate of change in
financial technology. During the last 25 years, a proliferation of new financial instruments
and a rapid development of new financial technologies have made it possible for aggressive
managers of insured institutions to expose state and federal deposit-insurance funds to a
numbe

Principal-agent problems lengthen recognition lags and decision lags for deposit insurers
and create incentives to understate the fund's exposure to losses. Tandem information
asymmetries exist between deposit institutions and their regulators and among regulators,
politicians, and taxpayers.
These information asymmetries are most severe for innovative forms of risk-taking.
Client firms' opportunities to conceal risk-taking strategies and losses from their insurer
increase with the volatility of the financial environment and with the rate of change in
financial technology. During the last 25 years, a proliferation of new financial instruments
and a rapid development of new financial technologies have made it possible for aggressive
managers of insured institutions to expose state and federal deposit-insurance funds to a
number of hard-to-understand risks (see Kane, 1985, ch. 5).
These environmental changes inc